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At issue before the Full Federal Court in Lawrence v FCT was the scope of the 
operation of s 177E(1) ITAA 1936, dealing with schemes by way of or in the nature 
of dividend stripping, or schemes having the effect of a scheme by way of or in the 
nature of a dividend stripping. While the taxpayer relied on High Court comments in 
FCT v Consolidated Press Holdings as limiting the ambit of schemes having the effect 
of dividend stripping, the Full Federal Court in Lawrence declined to adopt such an 
interpretation, finding instead that the High Court comments were merely illustrative 
of such schemes. This decision arguably adopts a potentially much broader 
interpretation of s177E in identifying schemes having the effect of a dividend 
stripping scheme. 
 
Introduction and outline 
 
The main focus of attention by the courts in the interpretation and application of the 
general anti-avoidance provision in Part IVA of the Income Tax Assessment Act 
(ITAA) 1936 has been directed to those provisions dealing with the identification of a 
scheme, a tax benefit, and the purpose of the scheme.1 However, an arguably equally 
significant component of the anti-avoidance regime in Part IVA is contained in s 
177E(1), which can operate to deem a scheme to be one to which Part IVA applies in 
circumstances where the scheme was ‘by way of or in the nature of dividend 
stripping’, or a scheme which had ‘substantially the effect of a scheme by way of or in 
the nature of a dividend stripping’.2 
 
                                                 
1 Section 177A defines a scheme; s 177C identifies a tax benefit; and s 177D provides matters to 
consider in the objective determination of the purpose of the scheme. 
2 Section 177E(1)     Where - 
(a)     as a result of a scheme that is, in relation to a company - 
(i)     a scheme by way of or in the nature of dividend stripping; or 
(ii)     a scheme having substantially the effect of a scheme by way of or in the nature of a dividend 
stripping, 
any property of the company is disposed of; 
(b)     in the opinion of the Commissioner, the disposal of that property represents, in whole or in part, a 
distribution (whether to a shareholder or another person) of profits of the company (whether of the 
accounting period in which the disposal occurred or of any earlier or later accounting period); 
(c)     if, immediately before the scheme was entered into, the company had paid a dividend out of 
profits of an amount equal to the amount determined by the Commissioner to be the amount of profits 
the distribution of which is, in his opinion, represented by the disposal of the property referred to in 
paragraph (a), an amount (in this subsection referred to as the "notional amount") would have been 
included, or might reasonably be expected to have been included, by reason of the payment of that 
dividend, in the assessable income of a taxpayer of a year of income; and 
(d)     the scheme has been or is entered into after 27 May 1981, whether in Australia or outside 
Australia, 
the following provisions have effect: 
(e)     the scheme shall be taken to be a scheme to which this Part applies; 
(f)     for the purposes of section 177F, the taxpayer shall be taken to have obtained a tax benefit in 
connection with the scheme that is referable to the notional amount not being included in the assessable 
income of the taxpayer of the year of income; and 
(g)     the amount of that tax benefit shall be taken to be the notional amount. 
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While these provisions have previously been the subject of judicial consideration, 
they were the subject of particular focus in the Federal Court3 and Full Federal Court4 
decisions in Lawrence v FCT. The transactions in the cases were characterised as 
distributable surplus arrangements, with the courts needing to determine whether such 
arrangements would fall within s 177E(1), and thus be subject to Part IVA. 
 
This paper analyses the decisions in the Lawrence cases, examining in particular the 
development by the courts of the interpretation as to what would constitute a scheme 
‘having substantially the effect of a scheme by way of or in the nature of a dividend 
stripping’. It is suggested that the decisions in the cases arguably demonstrate that 
with changing community attitudes over time to such schemes, the courts are prepared 
to respond with a changing interpretation and broader application of taxation law, 
particularly where the transactions exhibit features which could be characterised as at 
least lacking any real commercial justification, if not being artificial or contrived. 
 
The analysis in the paper suggests that evidence of the development of this wider 
judicial interpretation is provided by decisions such as that in Lawrence in the Full 
Federal Court. The court in that case declined to limit or interpret restrictively the 
comments of the High Court in FCT v Consolidated Press Holdings5 as to the indicia 
of a scheme having substantially the effect of a scheme by way of or in the nature of 
dividend stripping. Rather the court in Lawrence interpreted the High Court 
comments in Consolidated Press Holdings as illustrative only, thus leaving at large 
the identification of a scheme having substantially the effect of a scheme by way of or 




Following the limitations imposed by the courts on the operation of the then general 
anti-avoidance provision in s 260 ITAA 1936, the government introduced in 1981 a 
new general anti-avoidance provision intended to overcome these limitations.6 In 
broad terms, the major part of the provision applied when a scheme, as defined in s 
177A, produced a tax benefit, defined in s 177C, and the dominant purpose of the 
scheme was the production of that tax benefit, with s 177D providing matters to 
consider in determining this objective purpose. 
 
In addition to the provisions directed to anti-avoidance in general terms, s 177E(1) 
contained measures more specifically directed to preventing avoidance arrangements 
through the use of dividend stripping, which essentially involved a distribution being 
made in a more tax effective manner than would otherwise have been the case. 
 
The requirement for the additional code for dividend stripping in Part IVA was 
explained in the Second Reading Speech introducing the Bill. The additional 
provisions were said to be needed as a result of the particular feature of these schemes 
                                                 
3 Lawrence v FCT [2008] FCA 1497; referred to hereafter as Lawrence (FC). 
4 Lawrence v FCT [2009] FCAFC 29; referred to hereafter as Lawrence (FFC). 
5 FCT v Consolidated Press Holdings (2001) 207 CLR 235. 
6 Primary limitations included the ‘choice principle’ whereby the section would not be operative if the 
principal act offered choices for a transaction; and the inability to reconstruct a taxable transaction if 
the transaction was made void by s 260. 
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when viewed in the context of the structure,7 the particular feature being that, for 
schemes of this nature, there may technically be no tax benefit whereby the scheme 
could be brought within the general Part IVA provisions. To prevent dividend-
stripping schemes escaping Part IVA, s 177E(1) was introduced as a supplementary 
code.  
 
If a scheme is identified as a dividend stripping scheme for the purposes of s 177E(1), 
the  consequence is that the scheme is one to which Part IVA can apply, allowing the 
Commissioner to cancel the tax benefit8, and make compensating adjustments.9 
 
The circumstances in which a dividend stripping scheme may be a scheme to which 
Part IVA applies broadly require: 
 
• as a result of a scheme by way of or in the nature of dividend stripping, or a 
scheme having substantially the effect of a scheme by way of or in the nature 
of a dividend stripping, property of a company is disposed of; 
• the Commissioner forms the opinion that the disposal represents a distribution 
of profits of the company; and 
• immediately before the scheme, if the company had paid a dividend out of 
profits of an amount equal to the amount determined by the Commissioner to 
be the amount of profits the distribution of which is represented by the 
disposal of property, the amount would have, or might reasonably be expected 
to have, been included in assessable income of a taxpayer. 
 
The critical threshold condition to attract the operation of s 177E(1) is the 
identification of a scheme ‘by way of or in the nature of dividend stripping’ or a 
scheme ‘having substantially the effect of a scheme by way of or in the nature of a 
dividend stripping’. 
 
The Explanatory Memorandum (EM) accompanying the Bill suggested that s 177E(1) 
was intended to be a self-contained code to apply to dividend stripping schemes 
which effectively placed company profits in the hands of shareholders in a tax free 
form.10 While it is not clear from the legislation whether s 177E(1) was intended to be 
an exclusive code in relation to dividend stripping arrangements, it would be expected 
that, as a matter of statutory construction, the existence of a special provision would 
prevail over the more general provisions of Part IVA.11 
 
The EM explained the need for the additional provision in Part IVA in terms such 
that, although profits may have been stripped from a company, it may not be a 
reasonable hypothesis that, but for the scheme, the profits would have been paid as 
dividends. They may, in fact, have been retained in the company, in which case there 
would not have been a tax benefit.12 
 
                                                 
7 Second Reading Speech for Income Tax Laws Amendment Bill (No 2) 1981. 
8 Section 177F ITAA 1936. 
9 Section 177G ITAA 1936. 
10 Explanatory Memorandum accompanying Income Tax Laws Amendment Bill (No 2) 1981,at page 8. 
11 Broadly generalia specialibus non derogant; also see Reseck v FCT  75 ATC 4213. 
12 Above, note 10 - Section 177E: Stripping of company profits. 
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In Taxation Ruling IT2627, the point is made that the term ‘dividend stripping’ has no 
precise legal meaning, with the EM and the Ruling outlining a traditional dividend 
stripping scheme as involving a stripping entity which purchased shares in a target 
company with accumulated profits, with the stripping entity paying shareholders a 
capital sum representing the profits, and then drawing off the profits in a non-
assessable form.13 
 
In relation to schemes having substantially the same effect as a scheme by way of or 
in the nature of a dividend stripping, the EM suggested that such schemes may be 
those where the profits of the target company are not stripped by way of dividends, 
but by other transactions such as making irrevocable loans to associates of the 
stripper, or using profits to purchase near-worthless assets from an associate.14 
 
The use in the legislative provision of the terminology of ‘schemes having 
substantially the effect’ of a dividend stripping scheme must be seen as providing a 
potentially very wide ambit in relation to identifying such schemes, the intent being to 
preclude the use of variations on a theme to circumvent the first limb of s 177E(1)(a) 
or the general provisions in Part IVA. As noted in the EM, s 177E is intended to be 
“… a supplementary code to deal with dividend-stripping schemes of tax avoidance 
and certain variations on such schemes.”15 
 
It is significant that, unlike the general Part IVA provisions, s 177E(1) has no 
legislative threshold dependency on either an objective or subjective purpose of the 
scheme. On meeting the threshold tests, s 177E(1) could arguably automatically 
apply, with the scheme being one to which Part IVA applied, and the taxpayer being 
deemed to obtain a tax benefit. However, it may be expected that the purpose of 
parties to the scheme may assist in determining whether the scheme is by way of or in 
the nature of dividend stripping, or a scheme having substantially that effect. 
 
That purpose is now a relevant component of s 177E(1) has been affirmed by the 
High Court in Consolidated Press, as discussed later in the paper. 
 
The following analysis examines the interpretation by the Federal Court and Full 
Federal Court of the dividend stripping provisions, and application by the courts of 
these provisions to the issues raised in Lawrence. 
 
The transactions in Lawrence 
 
The facts of the Lawrence case were quite complex, involving two discrete but 
substantially identical series of transactions which effectively amounted to 
distributable surplus arrangements.16 As the two series of transactions were 
essentially the same, this paper outlines only one of the series of transactions. The 
diagram and details below summarise the main effects of the fifteen steps which were 
undertaken in the period between 10:30am and 12:55pm on June 8, 2003, with this 
process in itself leaving open the suggestion that the transactions could be 
                                                 
13 Taxation Ruling IT2627 paras 8, 9; EM at page 9. 
14 Above, note 10. 
15 EM at p 3; Note that this theme of variations on a dividend stripping scheme was reinforced by the 
finding of Jessop J in the Federal Court decision in Lawrence, as discussed later in the paper. 
16 The facts were outlined by the primary judge, Jessop J, in Lawrence (FC) at paras 8 – 30. 
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characterised as not having a commercial basis, but being arguably little more than 
artificial and contrived. 
 
Essentially the transactions involved a target company (Plaster Plus) with a 
distributable surplus acquiring shares which had an unpaid call and then subsequently 
paying the call on the shares. Value was then stripped from these shares purchased by 
Plaster Plus, with the stripped value being directed to Clearmink Trust, of which the 
shareholder in Plaster Plus was a discretionary beneficiary. Clearmink then made 
loans to this beneficiary (the shareholder in Plaster Plus) who received the amount as 
capital from Clearmink instead of as an assessable distribution from Plaster Plus. 
 
Critical to the series of transactions was that there was no change in the shareholding 
in Plaster Plus, the target company, as might be expected in a traditional dividend 
strip. Rather it was the value strip from Plaster Plus in favour of Clearmink, followed 
by a non-assessable distribution from Clearmink to the shareholder of Plaster Plus, 
which were the transactions at issue. 
 
 
Lauravale Pty Ltd 
Lawrence Family 
(Discretionary) Trust 





















The taxpayer in the case was the sole shareholder in Plaster Plus, which in the 
relevant year of income had $1.9 million in taxable income, leaving the company with 
$1.3 million in undistributed profits. Plaster Plus was thus the target company with 
distributable profits. The transactions outlined below were essentially designed to 
allow the taxpayer shareholder to access these distributable profits in a tax effective 
manner. 
 
Netscar Pty Ltd had available 900,000 shares in a number of different share classes, 
with Clearmink Pty Ltd holding the only two issued shares in Netscar. Netscar 
amended its company constitution so that ‘B’ class shares for return of capital ranked 
pari passu inter se with all other shares in the capital of the company and in surplus 
assets and profits, with the two shares held by Clearmink being converted to ‘A’ class 
shares. 
 
Denburrow Pty Ltd, a company controlled by the taxpayer’s solicitors, applied to 
Netscar for 1700 ‘B’ class shares which had a nominal value of $1000, but were paid 
as to only $1 per share. Netscar then issued a call on the ‘B’ class shares issued to 
Denburrow. Prior to paying the call, Denburrow sold the ‘B’ class shares to Plaster 
Plus at market value of the paid up amount of $1700, with Plaster Plus then becoming 
liable for the call on the unpaid amount. Plaster Plus paid this call by a Promissory 
Note payable to Netscar for approximately $1.7 million. 
 
Plaster Plus, the target company, has thus purchased shares with an unpaid call, and 
had then paid the call on these purchased ‘B’ class shares. 
 
At this stage the shareholding in Netscar comprised 2 ‘A’ class shares held by 
Clearmink, and 1700 ‘B’ class shares held by Plaster Plus, which had paid the call on 
the shares to Netscar. 
 
Netscar again amended its constitution so that the ‘B’ class shares were entitled to a 
return of only $1 per share, with no further entitlement, the consequence of which was 
that the ‘A’ class shares held by Clearmink had a substantial increase in value. The 
‘B’ class shares held by Plaster Plus had a corresponding diminution in value which 
was recorded as an extraordinary loss in the accounts of Plaster Plus.  
 
Effectively the value of the shares in Netscar held by Plaster Plus, the target company, 
had been stripped in favour of Clearmink, with the discretionary beneficiaries of 
Clearmink including the shareholder in Plaster Plus. 
 
Netscar, with the $1.7 million received from Plaster Plus for the call on the ‘B’ class 
shares, resolved to advance by way of a loan approximately $1.7 million to Clearmink 
in Clearmink’s capacity as trustee for the Clearmink No 1 Trust. The beneficiaries of 
the Clearmink No 1 Trust were the taxpayer and his family. The accounts of 
Clearmink No1 Trust showed loans made to the taxpayer, his wife, and Lauraval Pty 
Ltd, the trustee of the taxpayer’s family discretionary trust. 
 
With the value stripped from Plaster Plus to Clearmink, Clearmink had then made 
loans to the taxpayer. These amounts, representing the stripped distributable surplus 
of Plaster Plus, were received by the beneficiary in Clearmink (the shareholder in 
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Plaster Plus) in a capital form from Clearmink rather than an assessable form from 
Plaster Plus. 
 
At no stage in the transactions had there been any change in the shareholding in 
Plaster Plus, the target company. As noted by Jessop J, the primary judge in the 
Federal Court, the end result of the series of transactions was that profits held for 
distribution by a company (Plaster Plus) in which the taxpayer was the only 
shareholder had been effectively converted to capital sums held by another company 
(Clearmink) on trust for a class of discretionary beneficiaries confined to the taxpayer 




For the purposes of the current discussion, the significant issues which arose from the 
case concern three major areas: 
 
• identifying the scope of the scheme; 
• whether the scheme was by way of or in the nature of dividend stripping; and 
• whether the scheme had substantially the effect of a scheme by way of or in 
the nature of a dividend stripping. 
 
Scope of the scheme 
 
In seeking to limit the scope of an identified scheme in relation to the series of 
transactions, the taxpayer essentially argued that the relevant ‘scheme’ could not 
extend past the diminution in the rights of ‘B’ class shareholders in Netscar, and that 
the subsequent loans by the Clearmink No 1 Trust to the taxpayer, his wife and 
Lauravale could not be part of an identified scheme. 
 
The taxpayer in Lawrence argued that the decision in FCT v Hart18 was authority for 
the proposition that a Part IVA scheme must be recognised in a way that gave it a 
sensible relation to the tax benefits sought and the dominant purpose, the result being 
that in the current case, the scheme should be confined to the transactions which were, 
according to the Commissioner, identified as being those in the nature of dividend 
stripping, or which had the effect of dividend stripping.19 Effectively, the argument 
suggested that a scheme, for the purposes of s 177E(1), could not include transactions 
which occurred later in time than the disposal of property under s 177E(1), and any 
later transactions should be ignored.20 
 
While accepting this submission at a general level, Jessop J distinguished the decision 
in Hart, which was concerned with a tax benefit under s 177C and a purpose under s 
177D, from the current case which relied on s 177E, with no recourse to s 177C to 
identify the tax benefit. 
 
In rejecting this temporal limitation on the scope of a scheme, his Honour suggested 
that “… the court should not, in my view, turn a Nelsonian eye to facts, circumstances 
                                                 
17 Above, note 3 at para 2. 
18 FCT v Hart (2004) 217 CLR 216. 




or transactions which have the capacity to throw light on the matter merely because 
they post-date the property by reference to which the operation of the section is 
complete.”21 His Honour added a further reason for not limiting the scope of a 
scheme, being that the concept of dividend stripping involved, as one of its aspects, a 
consideration of purpose, and in determining this purpose there was “… no warrant in 
s 177E for the a priori exclusion of facts or events, before or after the actual 
disposal… ”22 from the considerations reflecting on the purpose. 
 
Although his Honour found that there was probably little that turned on whether the 
scheme went beyond the particular transactions or not, he took the view that whether 
schemes were by way of, or had substantially the effect of, dividend stripping should 
be approached as a composite enquiry, with all proven facts that had a rational 
tendency to provide the answer, being placed on the table.23 
 
While the scope and identification of a scheme has proven problematic in other Part 
IVA cases, it would appear that this finding of the primary judge was accepted, as the 
issue was not taken on appeal to the Full Federal Court. 
 
Schemes ‘by way of or in the nature of dividend stripping’ 
 
In relation to the issue of whether the scheme was a scheme ‘by way of or in the 
nature of dividend stripping’, Jessop J noted that no legislative definition was 
provided of what would constitute dividend stripping, but that the question has 
received considerable judicial deliberation in the Consolidated Press cases.24 
 
In FCT v Consolidated Press Holdings Ltd (No 1) in the Full Federal Court, the Court 
had regard to the identification of dividend stripping operations, the court finding that: 
 
These four cases[on dividend stripping] had the following characteristics in common:  
• a target company, which had substantial undistributed profits creating a 
potential tax liability either for the company or its shareholders;  
• the sale or allotment of shares in the target company to another party...;  
• the payment of a dividend to the purchaser or allottee of the shares out of 
the target company’s profits;  
• the purchaser escaping Australian income tax on the dividend so declared 
(whether by reason of a s 46 rebate, an offsetting loss on the sale of the 
shares, or the fact that the shareholders were resident outside Australia); and  
• the vendor shareholders receiving a capital sum for their shares in an 
amount the same as or very close to the dividends paid to the purchasers 
(there being no capital gains tax at the relevant times)…. 
A further common characteristic of each of the schemes in the cases considered by 
Gibbs J, was that they were carefully planned, with all the parties acting in concert, 
for the predominant if not the sole purpose of the vendor shareholders, in particular, 
avoiding tax on a distribution of dividends by the target company. 25  
 
                                                 
21 Ibid at para 56. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid at paras 57-58. 
24 CPH Property v FCT (1998) 88 FCR 21 in the Federal Court; FCT v Consolidated Press Holdings 
Ltd (No 1) (1999) 91 FCR 524 in the FFC; and FCT v Consolidated Press Holdings (2001) 207 CLR 
235 in the High Court. 
25 FCT v Consolidated Press Holdings Ltd (No 1) (1999) 91 FCR 524 at 561. 
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In relation to what might constitute a scheme ‘by way of or in the nature of dividend 
stripping, the Full Federal Court further noted that: 
 
The terms of the first limb of s 177E(1)(a) suggest that a scheme may fall within its 
scope, even though not all the elements of a dividend standard dividend stripping 
scheme are present. The use of the words "by way of or in the nature of" suggests that 
variations from the paradigm will not necessarily result in the scheme being excluded 
from the first limb, provided it retains the central characteristics of a dividend 
stripping scheme.26 
 
These central characteristics to which the court referred were the six points noted 
above, one of which was the purpose of the scheme. While the statute had not 
specifically required a purpose component for s 177E(1), the Full Federal court had 
added this requirement, and this was subsequently confirmed by the High Court.27 
 
The taxpayer in Lawrence submitted28 that there existed no potential tax liability for 
Plaster Plus or the taxpayer in relation to the undistributed profits held by Plaster Plus 
as tax had been paid on the profits. On this basis it was argued that the first of the 
conditions identified in Consolidated Press No (1) could not be satisfied. 
 
While accepting that there could be no potential tax liability for Plaster Plus, Jessop J 
was not satisfied on this matter in relation to the taxpayer, and concluded that the first 
of the elements identified in Consolidated Press No (1) could be satisfied. His Honour 
considered that the first requirement in the Consolidated Press test was not that 
profits would necessarily have been distributed as dividends in the year of disposal, 
but rather, “(i)t is merely that the existence of the undistributed profits created a 
potential tax liability for shareholders.”29 As explained by his Honour, the very point 
of introducing s 177E(1) was to catch those schemes which may not otherwise have 
been caught as it would not be possible to say that dividends would likely be paid but 
for the scheme.30 
 
However, while finding this first test satisfied, His Honour could not be satisfied that 
the other characteristics were present in the current case, and therefore concluded that 
the scheme did not meet the s 177E(1) test of being ‘by way of or in the nature of 
dividend stripping’. 
 
The Full Federal Court in Lawrence noted that it was not surprising that this finding 
by the primary judge was not subject to appeal, affirming that the scheme did not 
possess the characteristics required to be a scheme ‘by way of or in the nature of 
dividend stripping’.31 
 
Schemes ‘having substantially the effect of a scheme by way of or in the nature of a 
dividend stripping’ 
 
                                                 
26 Ibid at 566. 
27 Above, note 5 at para 133. 
28 Above, note 3 at para 54. 
29 Ibid at para 72 
30 Ibid at para 64. 
31 Above, note 4 at para 30. 
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The second threshold test to attract the operation of s 177E(1) is that a scheme has 
‘substantially the effect of a scheme by way of or in the nature of a dividend 
stripping,’ and the discussion below considers the interpretation by the court of this 
phrase, and the apparent broadening in the interpretation arising from the decision in 
Lawrence. 
 
On this issue, the taxpayer had argued that the only way in which paragraph (ii) of s 
177E(1)(a) operated to extend paragraph (i) was that profits of a target company were 
distributed by some means other than payment of a dividend, but that the provision 
still required that the shares of the target company had been purchased from the 
original shareholders. As the shares in Plaster Plus had not changed hands, and there 
had been no distribution of the profits of Plaster Plus to new owners, the taxpayer’s 
view was that the scheme could not be said to substantially have the effect of a 
dividend stripping scheme. 
 
In the Federal Court, Jessop J noted that “… the distinction between a scheme which 
is by way of or in the nature of dividend stripping and a scheme which is not such a 
scheme but which has substantially the effect of such a scheme is not an easy one,”32 
with the legislation requiring the courts “… to look at circumstances other than the 
mere fact that company property has been disposed of in a way which represents a 
distribution of profits.”33 His Honour had regard to the EM, noting that “… 
Parliament wanted to catch ‘variations’ on dividend stripping schemes, and 
considered that  the unifying principle of all such schemes and variations was that 
they had the effect of placing company profits in the hands of shareholders in a tax-
free form, in substitution for taxable dividends.34 
 
His Honour noted that the EM stated that the category of schemes having 
substantially the effect of a dividend stripping scheme would include: 
 
…schemes in which the profits of the target company are not stripped from it by a 
formal dividend payment but by way of such transactions as the making of 
irrevocable loans to entities that are associates of the stripper, or the use of the profits 
to purchase near-worthless assets from such associates.35  
 
It is suggested that this highlighted the legislative intention that schemes having 
substantially the effect of a dividend stripping could diverge greatly from a traditional 
dividend stripping arrangement, and still be squarely within the scope of the 
application of s 177E(1). 
 
These comments from the EM would also appear to be reflected in the decision in 
Consolidated Press Holdings in the High Court, where the court had concluded that 
schemes having substantially the effect of a dividend stripping scheme were those 
schemes where some means other than a dividend or deemed dividend was used in 
making the distribution.36 As noted by the High Court, 
 
                                                 
32 Above, note 3 at para 76. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid at para 78 
36 Above, note 5. 
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But a scheme may have substantially the effect of a scheme by way of or in the nature 
of dividend stripping even though some means other than a dividend or deemed 
dividend is employed to make the distribution.37 
 
The High Court in Consolidated Press had also examined the requirement for a tax-
avoidance purpose in the application of s 177E(1), and had concluded that there did 
need to be such a purpose. As noted by the Court, s 177E had been placed in Part IVA 
to supplement the anti-avoidance provisions, and as a result “… (t)his is not an 
example of a statutory provision in respect of which a purposive construction is 
merely an available choice; such a construction is necessary.”38 
 
Jessop J noted that if this formulation of a scheme having the effect of a dividend 
stripping scheme by the High Court, and the examples in the EM, were read as an 
exhaustive statement of what would constitute a scheme having substantially the 
effect of a dividend stripping, then this would provide support for the taxpayer’s 
position. However, His Honour did not read this formulation as being definitive, but 
merely as providing examples or illustrations only.39  
 
In relation to the EM, his Honour stated that 
 
… the relevant paragraph is expressed as providing examples or indications 
only, and not as though definitive. I do not read the paragraph as indicating a 
legislative intention that there always need be a separate person or entity, into 
whose hands the relevant shareholding has first passed. Indeed, the reference 
to near-worthless assets, as an alternative to a formal dividend payment, amply 
accommodates a situation in which the target company itself purchases such 
assets from associates of its existing shareholders.40 
 
It is suggested that Jessop J, by this interpretation, is distinguishing schemes ‘by way 
of or in the nature of dividend stripping’ from schemes ‘having substantially the 
effect’ of a dividend stripping scheme, and in so doing, is providing a broader 
formulation for the latter category of scheme. In particular, his Honour is suggesting 
that the characteristic of schemes in the nature of dividend stripping, whereby there is 
a disposal of interests in the target company, is not a requirement for schemes having 
substantially the effect of dividend stripping schemes, thus extending the realm of 
schemes having substantially the effect of dividend stripping beyond the more 
traditional view of a scheme by way of or in the nature of dividend stripping. 
 
In relation to the High Court finding in Consolidated Press, Jessop J noted that : 
 
I do not think that the High Court’s words – "except for the fact that the distribution 
by the target company was not by way of a dividend or deemed dividend" – should be 
pressed into service to justify the conclusion that a scheme will never fall within 
subpar (ii) unless it involves the transfer of shares in the target company to a person 
or entity separate from the original shareholders. That would be to extend the 
meaning of those words beyond anything that their Honours had in contemplation.  
                                                 
37 Ibid at para 140. 
38 Ibid at para 132. 





When (the High Court) pointed put that the subparagraph was ‘aimed at’ a scheme 
that would be within subpara (i) save for the fact `that the distribution was not by way 
of dividend, their Honours were, in my respectful view, stressing that the difference 
between subpara (i) and subpara (ii) lay in the means adopted to distribute the profits 
of the target company.41 
 
Again this highlights the broader interpretation of schemes ‘having substantially the 
effect’ of dividend stripping, with the High Court suggesting that there is no 
requirement under this second limb for there to be a change in ownership of interests 
in the target, as would be required to satisfy the first limb of a sheme ‘by way of or in 
the nature of dividend stripping’. Because there is no requirement under the second 
limb for a change in ownership of interests in the target, the distribution by the target 
need not be by way of a dividend or deemed dividend, which would be the expected 
means of distribution with a traditional dividend strip where there would be new 
ownership of the target. 
 
In his consideration of the High Court decision in Consolidated Press, Jessop J also 
reinforced the finding of the High Court as to the requirement for a tax-avoidance 
purpose for the second limb of s 177E(1): 
 
… their Honours’ concern was to lay out their reasons for holding that the presence of 
a tax-avoidance purpose was a requirement of subpara(ii), no less than of subpara (i) 
… It followed that the requirement for a tax-avoidance purpose, being basic to the 
idea of dividend stripping in any form, existed equally under subpara (ii).42 
 
On this basis of the foregoing considerations, Jessop J was prepared to find that 
“(b)oth for the taxpayer and for the revenue, the effects of the schemes in the present 
case were substantially the same as the effect of a scheme by way of or in the nature 
of dividend stripping.”43 
 
His Honour considered that the facts in the current case provided an example of the 
way that profits of a company could be placed in the hands of an associate of the 
taxpayer in a tax free form, and he considered it consistent with the aims of the 
section that the second limb of s 177E(1)(a) be construed to cover examples of this 
kind.44 As noted by his Honour, “… the value … that started out as undistributed 
profits in Plaster Plus … had become accretions to the capital of the Clearmink trusts. 
Subject only to the discretionary nature of these trusts, the applicant and his associates 
were beneficially entitled to that capital.”45 
 
This component of the judgment in Lawrence was subject to appeal to the Full 
Federal Court. 
 
The Full Federal Court46 concurred with the findings of the primary judge that the 
passage from Consolidated Press in the High Court was not definitive but merely 
                                                 
41 Ibid at para 81 – 82. 
42 Ibid at para 81. 
43 Ibid at para 85. 
44 Ibid at para 80. 
45 Ibid at para 85. 
46 Ryan, Stone and Edmonds JJ. 
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illustrative of schemes which would substantially have the effect of a dividend 
stripping scheme. Their Honours concluded that “(h)aving regard to the terms of the 
second limb of s 177E(1)(a) and the extrinsic material … the Plaster Plus transactions 
… are paradigm examples of a scheme to which the second limb was intended to 
apply.”47 
 
Their Honours went further, however, suggesting that the passage from Consolidated 
Press which was relied on by the taxpayer was in fact obiter. As noted by their 
Honours, “Consolidated Press  was a first limb case … The only reason the second 
limb of s 177E(1)(a) was considered by the Full Court and the High Court was 
because of the primary judge’s reasoning that the second limb did not require the 
presence of a tax avoidance purpose.” 48  
 
With the comments of the High Court in Consolidated Press being cast as obiter, the 
comments could not be relied on by the taxpayer in this case as limiting the scope of 
application of the second limb of s 177E(1)(a). It is suggested that this again 
illustrates that the decision in Lawrence provides evidence that courts will not 
consider themselves constrained or limited in the application of anti-avoidance 
provisions, particularly if they consider the transactions appear to lack a commercial 
rationale, but appear to have the characteristics of being artificial or contrived.  
 
Broadened scope of schemes ‘having substantially the effect’ 
 
Prior to the decisions by the Federal Court in the Lawrence cases, the prevailing 
guidance as to whether a scheme had substantially the effect of a dividend stripping 
scheme lay in the EM and in the finding of the High Court in Consolidated Press. 
This decision held that: 
 
What sub-par (ii) was aimed at was a scheme that would be within sub-par (i) except 
for the fact that the distribution by the target company was not by way of a dividend 
or deemed dividend. Dividend stripping does not lose its connotation of tax avoidance 
purpose. But a scheme may have substantially the effect of a scheme by way of or in 
the nature of dividend stripping even though some means other than a dividend or 
deemed dividend is employed to make the distribution.49 
 
This finding suggested that the court saw the additional ground covered by sub-par 
(ii), relating to schemes having substantially the effect of a dividend stripping scheme, 
involving a target company making a distribution in a manner other than a dividend or 
a deemed dividend. Such an interpretation would be in accord with the traditional 
concept of dividend stripping, where the rationale involved new owners accessing 
profits held by the target company in a more tax effective manner than would have 
been available to the previous shareholders.50 
 
If such was intended by the court, then a distribution in a manner other than as a 
dividend or deemed dividend by an entity other than the target company would 
presumably be outside the scope of sub-par (ii), and not fall within Part IVA. This 
                                                 
47 Above, note 4 at  para 52. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Above, note 5. 
50 See, for example, Investment and Merchant Finance Corp. v FCT (1971) 125 CLR 249. 
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was the very argument relied on by the taxpayer, and presumably the rationale 
underlying the taxpayer’s complex arrangement, whereby the tax effective 
distribution was not made by the target company but an associate of the target. 
 
However, the finding of the primary judge in Lawrence, with which the Full Federal 
Court agreed, was that this narrow interpretation of the decision in Consolidated 
Press was not what the court had intended. By finding that the court in Consolidated 
Press was merely providing non-exhaustive illustrative examples of the situations 
where the second limb of s 177E(1)(a) may apply, the decision in Lawrence rejects 
the notion that a dividend stripping scheme requires a distribution by the target to new 
shareholders. The decision broadens the scope of s 177E(1)(a)(ii) so that a distribution 
by another entity, other than the target, can still taint the transaction, rendering it 
subject to Part IVA.  
 
The Full Federal Court in Lawrence went further, suggesting that by having regard to 
the terms of the legislation and the extrinsic material, the transactions in this case 
were “… paradigm examples of a scheme to which the second limb (of s 177E(1)(a)) 
was intended to apply.”51 It may be suggested that the apparent artificial and 
contrived nature of the arrangements can only have assisted the court in reaching such 
a conclusion. 
 
What the decision of the court in this case suggests is that there can be variations from 
the traditional dividend strip, and the arrangement may still have substantially the 
effect of a dividend stripping scheme. The particular variations encompassed in this 
case were that there need be no change of ownership interests in the target, and 
consequently the distribution need not be by the target in the form of dividend or 
deemed dividend, which would be the traditional manner of distribution if the target 
was subject to new ownership. 
 
Additionally, the Full Federal Court in Lawrence also suggested that the comments of 
the Full Federal Court and the High Court in Consolidated Press in relation to s 
177E(1)(a)(ii) were obiter, as the cases had been determined on the basis of the first 
limb in s 177E(1)(a). On this basis, the decision of the court in Lawrence becomes the 
ratio for applying the second limb, and as noted, this provides a much broader 
application for the second limb of s 177E(1)(a), as a scheme having the effect of a 
dividend stripping scheme can be identified where the tax effective distribution is 
made not only in a form other than as a dividend or deemed dividend, but it is made 
by an entity other than the target entity. 
 
The Full Federal Court also made it clear that each of the limbs will have an 
independent operation, as each is directed to different circumstances. While the first 
limb is directed to identifying schemes that could be seen as schemes by way of or in 
the nature of dividend stripping schemes, the second limb is not so constrained. 
Rather, the second limb is directed to identifying other schemes which might have the 
same outcome or consequence as a scheme by way of or in the nature of a dividend 
stripping schemes, but which are not schemes by way of or in the nature of a dividend 
stripping schemes. As noted by the Court, “(a) scheme falling within the second limb 
                                                 
51 Above, note 4 at para 52. 
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may not, as in this case, fall within the first limb. On the other hand, a scheme falling 
within the first limb will never fall within the second limb.”52 
 
This delineation by the court of the independent operation of the two limbs also 
arguably broadens the operation of the second limb of s 177E(1)(a). The second limb 
would be no longer limited to a scheme identified as a dividend stripping scheme, but 
would have a broader ambit to also encompass those other schemes not so 
characterised as dividend stripping schemes, but which have the same effect or 
outcome as a dividend stripping scheme. On this basis, s 177E(1)(a)(ii) has a 
potentially very wide scope, and becomes a provision to which tax planners may need 




As noted, s 177E(1) stands as part of the Part IVA anti-avoidance regime, but operates 
as an independent component separate from the general regime. The need for this 
separate provision was noted in the EM as relating to circumstances where it may not 
have been possible to identify a tax benefit to a taxpayer. 
 
Within the first limb of s 177E(1)(a), the courts have been prepared to identify those 
characteristics which need to be present to conclude the existence of a scheme by way 
of or in the nature of dividend stripping. Schemes by way of, or in the nature of, 
dividend stripping would be expected to display some of the characteristics of a 
traditional dividend stripping arrangement, with a change in ownership of a target 
entity holding undistributed profits, and the new owners being able to access these 
profits in a more tax effective manner than would have been available to the former 
owners. 
 
Under the operation of the second limb, the characterisation of schemes as having 
substantially the effect of a scheme by way of or in the nature of a dividend stripping 
has proven more problematic. While the High Court in Consolidated Press was 
prepared to identify some features which identify these schemes, the decision in 
Lawrence has demonstrated that these features cannot be seen as either exhaustive or 
determinative, and subsequent courts will not feel constrained or limited by the 
identification of these features. Rather, the decision highlighted that the factors 
identified in Consolidated Press were merely illustrative examples, and should not be 
relied on as prescribing limits on schemes which may fall within the characterisation 
of a scheme ‘substantially having the effect of a scheme by way of or in the nature of 
a dividend stripping.’ 
 
This suggests that the second limb of s 177E(1) will be interpreted more broadly in 
identifying schemes having substantially the effect of dividend stripping. In particular, 
such schemes need not display the feature of a change in ownership of the target, and 
a distribution by the target as a dividend or deemed dividend, both of which would be 
features of a traditional dividend strip or a scheme by way of or in the nature of 
dividend stripping. 
 




With the second legislative limb of s 177E(1)(a) being drafted in terms of a test 
determined by the effect or outcome, regard needs to be had to whether the outcome 
of a transaction or scheme could also have been achieved by a scheme by way of or in 
the nature of dividend stripping. If an effectively equivalent outcome could have been 
achieved by a scheme by way of or in the nature of dividend stripping, then it would 
appear open to the courts to determine that the particular scheme is a scheme having 
substantially the effect of a scheme by way of or in the nature of a dividend stripping, 
which then must make that scheme vulnerable under Part IVA. 
 
With the Full Federal Court in Lawrence declining to adopt a narrow interpretation of 
the examples of schemes having the effect of dividend stripping provided by the High 
Court in Consolidated Press, the operation of the second limb on s 177(1)(a) would 
appear to be at large, being able to be applied to any scheme where the outcome could 
have been achieved by a more traditional dividend stripping arrangement. It is 
suggested that this provides evidence that the courts are prepared to adopt a broader 
application of anti-avoidance taxation law, particularly in relation to transactions 
which may be open to characterisation as little more than artificial or contrived. The 
extent of this broader interpretation remains to be seen. 
